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FORGING ‘SOFT’ ACCOUNTABILITY IN UNLIKELY 
SETTINGS: 
A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
THE CONTEXT OF SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION  
 






This study sets out to introduce the concept of ‘soft’ accountability as a new approach to 
understand mutual accountability (MA) in unlikely settings of development cooperation 
through South-South Cooperation (SSC). In doing so, this study analyzes three defining 
components of accountability (responsibility, answerability and enforceability), and identifies 
the actors and modalities of MA in four different situations of SSC mechanisms. The main 
finding in this conceptual analysis contains establishing an institutional and sustainable 
development platform for SSC MA by not only reflecting the distinctive nature of SSC but 
also focusing on responsibility first in order to reduce buck-passing among actors and to 
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Introduction: The ‘Orphan’ Pillar in ‘Unlikely’ Settings 
International development efforts have been long cherished as the global North’s one-sided 
humanitarian intervention into the global South’s poverty and disease issues. Since the Paris 
Declaration of 2005, however, recent requests for mutual accountability for the global 
partnership echo not only donor-driven demands for holding partner countries to account but 
also partner countries’ strategic concerns regarding the transparent and receptive management 
of donors’ development policies.1 In addition, the emerging importance of development 
cooperation among developing countries, which is often described as South-South cooperation 
(SSC), has increasingly received warm consideration from international aid agencies due to its 
complementarity with the traditional utility of North-South cooperation. The core value of 
mutual accountability, therefore, is re-examined as a crosscutting essence for both North-South 
cooperation and SSC, particularly in light of the contemporary changing development 
landscape.  
 Although the commitments of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) still remain 
unfulfilled, the international aid community is now heading towards a new Post-2015 
development era. The world economic crisis has eroded the debt sustainability of developing 
countries, trade negotiations have been stalemated with the waning of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) system and fragmented into multiple free trade agreements, and the equal 
access to affordable medicines and technology has become patchy. Traditional donors of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) are facing serious economic downturn and this has resulted in an ensuing 
budget cutback of official development assistance (ODA). Against such an adverse backdrop, it 
is a prerequisite to accelerate the progress of enabling environments which invites emerging 
SSC providers into a new global partnership framework beyond the outdated SSC.2 Another 
key part of building such a global partnership stems from accountability mechanisms which 
make development partners more mutually accountable to each other, thereby reinforcing 
mutual trust and positive incentives to further participate in development partnership.3 
 The growing centrality of SSC is a result of its complementary role in sustaining the 
current global architecture of international development.4In particular, the 2008 Accra High 
Level Forum III formally endorsed the contributory function of SSC for aid effectiveness, and 
the 2011 Busan High Level Forum IV re-emphasized the vitality of SSC as one of the key 
success points in its Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (hereinafter, 
the Busan Global Partnership).UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s message for the UN Day 
for SSC in 2013 openly confirmed the significance of SSC by underlining its contributions to 
common development challenges through sharing best practices, funding pilot projects with 
local knowledge, providing the capital to scale up successful projects and supplying regional 
public goods with appropriate technologies. SSC partners turn to each other for lessons on 
innovative policies and schemes to address and share their own successful experiences. Indeed, 
more proper solutions are available across the global South, which, if adequately harnessed, 
make meaningful contributions at both the regional and global level.  
 The issue of accountability, akin to SSC, has obtained relatively recent attention from 
the international aid community. At the 2005 High Level Forum II, mutual accountability (MA) 
was spotlighted as one of the key principles for the Paris Declaration, while the Busan Global 
Partnership reinforced MA as one of the four major principles of the Busan Outcome 
Document. In addition, Mr. Ban’s synthesis report – ‘The Road to Dignity by 2030’ – to the 
UN General Assembly in December 2014 galvanized the transparency and evaluative 
contributions of MA to the processes of Post-2015 development agendas. It is a cliché to state 
that MA promotes an equal partnership between programme countries and aid providers and 
should be a key means of ensuring compliance with MDGs’ commitments, the Busan Global 
Partnership, and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) beyond 2015. However, there is 
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no internationalized general consensus on the definition of MA and its associated mechanisms 
to put MA into practice. Requesting accountability generates double jeopardy for donors in 
terms of not only meeting the transparent and accountable use of national levies for aid but also 
holding recipient governments accountable for their commitments. Still, there is a serious lack 
of scholarly attempts to discuss how to render SSC accountable.  
In fact, linking MA with SSC is a complex task for the following two reasons. Firstly, 
the notion of MA per se is slippery with its conceptual loopholes lacking sophisticated 
components consisting of MA. Translating the idea of MA into international aid practices has 
not been easy, particularly in terms of its practical scope – accountability to whom and for what? 
Unlike the other four principles of the Paris Declaration, measuring MA has not been cemented 
as a mature method for enhancing aid effectiveness. It is in this regard that MA has been 
cynically treated as the ‘orphan pillar’ of the Paris Declaration.5 Secondly, MA’s translation 
by SSC leads to the politicization problem: public accountability is converted into a political 
agenda calling into question how Southern partners hold the others to account while all SSC 
partners work together for solidarity-based common goals.6Embedding mutual accountability 
into the barren soil of SSC often remains as an inherently contested, politically misleading, and 
practically ineffectual process. Given that SSC is constituted on the virtue of mutual benefit 
and the recognition of reciprocity among partner countries, the request of MA, by all accounts, 
becomes a sensitive issue, which drives them into the arena of conflict over who is accountable 
to whom, thereby exploring the rugged landscapes of power and voice in accountability 
politics.7 
 In this regard, this study is undertaken to fill in an explanatory vacuum at the intersection 
of SSC and MA by aiming to provide a conceptual/theoretical overview of how accountability 
fits into the domain of SSC. Its focal points involve a scholarly scrutiny of the social 
construction between the Western concept of accountability and the local realities of 
programme countries. Accountability is viewed as a normative condition for the effective 
implementation of aid programmes, and the point of analysis is focused on institutional 
transfers of accountability by examining how the Western norm is accepted and 
institutionalized in the local settings of programme countries. As the global South has been 
keen on the issue of dependencies upon aid packages from the North, imposing MA 
mechanisms without considering national variances of programme countries results in weighing 
down counterparts in the South. In view of that, we propose ‘soft’ accountability as an 
alternative concept of MA, suitable for SSC’s unlikely settings. In practice, all partners need to 
redouble their efforts to harness the wealth of knowledge, expertise and development thinking 
of the global South within the frame of MA. The fundamental goal of accountability 
mechanisms involves behavioural changes for development partners and the reduction of 
buck-passing. The appropriate graft of MA onto SSC becomes a critical platform for 
undergirding a positive linkage between the significance of accountability and the rise of the 
global South, but how to marry MA with SSC has not yet begun to be discussed.  
 In identifying soft accountability for SSC, this study proceeds in four steps. Firstly, it 
starts by reconsidering MA in the developmental context and reviewing the historical evolution 
of SSC as an analytical backdrop for the premise that MA remains opaque in order to illustrate 
its effective functions within SSC. Secondly, it seeks to translate MA in the context of SSC by 
not only classifying the three components (responsibility, answerability, and enforceability) but 
also making possible scenarios of MA in different settings of SSC. Thirdly, it seeks to assess 
ways of forging MA for SSC by addressing the feasibility of soft accountability. Lastly, the 
conclusion proposes the key components of soft accountability by emphasizing the 
interconnectedness of local MA and international MA for SSC.  
 
The Stunted Evolution of Mutual Accountability 
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Normally, accountability mechanisms in the domestic terrain require three institutional 
components to hold political elites to account:1) democratic voting or appointing 
mechanisms; 2) evaluation processes; and 3) withdrawal of political support, along with 
shaming and physical sanctions if their performances are poor.8 However, in most areas of 
global governance, different forms of accountability co-exist in an incomplete form. 
Critically, the lack of centralized public authorities hampers global stakeholders from 
calling upon MA to be operated in a democratic fashion. When it comes to mutually 
accountable mechanisms, the purview of account-holders and duty-bearers becomes much 
more complicated and the exact location of responsibility becomes blurred.  
 Aid giving has increasingly been under scrutiny with increasing demands for 
accountable results since the 2005 Paris Declaration. The Paris Declaration stipulates that 
MA can be enhanced by jointly assessing mutual progress in implementing agreed 
commitments on aid effectiveness through existing country level mechanisms. However, 
the result of the MA principle was far from the target, even though a progress was made to 
some extent. By the end of 2010, only 38 per cent of developing countries had introduced 
mutual review process. Among these, only 32 per cent of sub-Saharan African countries 
had established MA mechanisms, while about 60 per cent of Asia and the Pacific countries 
had implemented MA mechanisms. 
Subsequently, the Accra Agenda for Action reaffirmed the crucial need for MA along 
with transparency by presenting it as ‘essential elements for development results.’9 However, 
the Paris MA indicator remained the same in the Accra Agenda for Action without further 
improvement and the Busan Global Partnership also failed to change or advance the existing 
approach to MA. Indeed, development partners fell behind the MA target of the Paris 
Declaration, due to the lack of clear-cut conceptualization. Despite the growing consensus on 
the significance of MA, the definitional contestation of accountability retarded its semantic and 
institutional consolidation. Although the Paris and Accra agreements have gradually broadened 
understanding of MA and have slowly changed aid stakeholders’ behaviour, MA still appears 
to be an emerging agenda and it needs to be further developed in order to achieve concrete 
understanding amongst aid stakeholders. 
 Another reason for disappointing results of the MA principle could be due to there 
being no single over-arching authority to monitor behaviours and govern corrections for 
stakeholders. In particular, donors lack willingness to accept the enforcement mechanism for 
poor performance. At the core of MA is how development partners mutually hold themselves 
to account through the availability of information, performance monitoring, and adequate 
incentives for compliance. Under the absence of a globalized central authority, the MA 
principles are unable to be fully adapted amongst development partners at the country level, 
even though a handful of evidence lies in anecdotal records from aid workers in countries.  
The political rhetoric of MA, nevertheless, has been evolving in two positive directions. 
Firstly, the UN Development Group has enlarged the concept of ‘data revolution’ by coining 
the term ‘accountability revolution’ in order to establish data-enabled national, regional and 
international frameworks for monitoring and accountability of development delivery.10 The 
urge for moving frontiers from data revolution to accountability revolution reflects not only the 
rationale that transparency is not enough to be accountable for development results, but also the 
UN Secretary-General’s emphasis on the significance of robust accountability mechanisms for 
all stakeholders in achieving SDGs beyond 2015.11 Secondly, more engagement from the 
bottom level in public management, such as citizens’ participation, can be also a useful driver 
for achieving accountability revolution in the Post-2015 development era.12 Such a 
mobilization of civic engagement aims to prevent political elites from enjoying permanent 
power. This civic intervention in political affairs makes political leaders of aid-receiving 




South-South Cooperation at the Crossroads  
We now turn briefly to review the historical evolution of SSC from the Bandung Conference to 
its contemporary stage. The birth of SSC can be found in the Bandung Conference in 1955 as 
an effort to promote non-aligned cooperation across the global South. In 1978, the UN 
Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries took initiative for the 
official strategic framework for SSC as the result of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action.13 
Meanwhile, the G77, created in 1964, has been acting as a formal cooperation forum for the 
global South under the UN context, and has continuously adopted milestones of international 
efforts, such as the Charter of Algiers (1967), the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (1978), the 
Caracas Declaration (1989), the First South Summit in Havana (2000), the first SSC conference 
on science and technology in Dubai (2002) and the Second Summit in Doha (2005). Besides 
the G77, the G33 in the WTO and the G24 in the IMF have also played roles in driving SSC in 
international cooperation.14 
 The original definition of SSC was built upon political, economic and social exchanges, 
including trade, investment and technology among Southern partners, the private sector and 
civil society organizations (CSOs). However, the Accra High Level Forum III redefined SSC 
within the development cooperation regime by focusing on South-South peer learning and 
knowledge sharing as a way of solving ‘common’ development challenges.15 This change 
reflects the ‘horizontal partnerships’ of SSC spirit articulated with equity, trust, mutual benefit 
and flexibility. Accordingly, SSC includes concessional loans and grants, including technical 
cooperation, provided for development purposes. 
 However, SSC has faced challenges, such as a lack of appropriate monitoring and 
evaluation, managing quality data, and improving transparency.16 As such, these limitations 
prompted SSC to learn from North-South cooperation to stimulate transparency and MA. Both 
the Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan Global Partnership clearly encouraged all 
development partners, including SSC actors, to adapt and enrich the aid effectiveness principles 
of the Paris Declaration in order to enhance the complementarity with the traditional 
North-South cooperation. Notwithstanding, the Busan Global Partnership’s 10 indicators and 
four shared principles remained as a voluntary code of conduct, rather than compulsory clauses. 
It is also worthwhile to note that some SSC providers still consider the Busan Global 
Partnership as a strong push from traditional donors, thereby preferring more neutral 
mechanisms, such as the G20.17 
 In spite of the dearth of robust MA mechanisms for SSC, the UN and international aid 
communities, as in the 2003 Marrakech Declaration on SSC, recognized that SSC is not an 
option but an imperative to complement North-South cooperation in achieving the MDGs.18 
SSC is about the force of solidarity and mutual benefit, with which international aid 
communities can overcome even the biggest challenges in the wake of the financial crisis and 
economic downturns in traditional donor states. Meanwhile, UN agencies agreed on the 
importance of tracking, monitoring and evaluating and mainstreaming activities on SSC in the 
UN Development Cooperation Forum. Such a consensus on the need for accountability 
mechanisms in SSC with even an embryonic form was balanced out by another consensus that 
MA for SSC must be demand-driven and implemented in accordance with national priorities. 
Also, donor agencies generally seem to agree on the introduction of SSC at the regional and 
sub-regional levels through regional coordination arrangements.19By contrast, the Southern 
partner countries appear to have big concerns about the risk of MA in the sense of the North’s 
initiative and dominance in shaping normative ideas of MA and its risks in abusing power 
rather than regulating power-holders. Thus, the point of analysis focuses on an uncomfortable 
mix of SSC’s positive contributions to aid relations and its negative combination with MA. 
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Translating Mutual Accountability into South-South Cooperation   
OECD-DAC donors’ formulation of MA has a particular set of mechanisms for themselves, 
despite still lacking clear systemic implementation mechanisms. Without modifications, they 
should not simply be translated and applied as ‘the universal model’ for middle/low-income 
countries engaged in SSC. The experience of accountability is not only highly diverse and 
complex but also becomes easily politicized in terms of the North-South dichotomy. SSC 
engages MA in ways that takes account of the articulated approaches of SSC: strengthening 
capacities for self-development, implementing principles of country ownership, equality and 
mutual benefit, and sharing development experience amongst SSC partners.  
 Customizing MA for SSC is a necessary condition for forging accountability mechanisms 
properly for its unlikely settings. Two processes are required for this customization. First, some 
distinctive characteristics of SSC are taken into consideration: conventionally weak domestic 
demands for holding governmental implementers accountable to their commitments; and long 
historical legacies of SSC based upon trust building and mutual benefits, in accordance with 
non-intervention of sovereign issues. The calibre of MA for SSC should be re-crystallized in 
the context of intergovernmental relations of the global South, rather than in the domestic 
dimensions of full-blown democracies. SSC and its aid relations are difficult to value on a 
comparable basis across countries anchored in North-South cooperation. It is thus critical to see 
whether cultural relativity impacts the exportation of accountability and results in successful 
acceptance, hybrid accountability or voluntary accountability.20 
 Nevertheless, there are some lessons from DAC donor practices which SSC partners may 
find relevant as they develop their own path of MA. At the national level, accountability is a 
political issue between the state and civil society in the sense that it is how ‘the governed’ hold 
‘the governors’ to account.21 Problems of capture and bias indicate that both formal and 
informal systems of accountability unfairly exclude vulnerable groups and reinforce inequality. 
On the other hand, ‘accountability politics’ can be applied to the principal-agent relationship 
between aid-giving countries and programme countries. Obviously, accountable delivery of 
development cooperation is critical to improving its quality and effectiveness in achieving 
better development results. It is a central problem in politics that SSC actors must seriously 
take into consideration – poorly designed programmes can undermine accountability. Focusing 
on accountability in the domain of SSC, thus, is controversial, because it concerns the nature of 
the political settlement. 
 In this sense, it is critical to articulate how the existing conceptualization of MA can be 
reshaped for the unusual context of SSC. The generic term of MA holds the notion that 
‘programme partners and all other development cooperation actors are called to be accountable 
for the effectiveness of development cooperation, but they all need to make accountability more 
mutual, by making providers more accountable to programme country governments, and 
providers and programme country governments more accountable to intended beneficiaries of 
development cooperation and taxpayers in provider countries.’22 Since this term provides 
definitional contents but remains still too broad to be relevantly modified to SSC, MA needs to 
be more sophisticatedly re-conceptualized by the partition of its three conceptual components – 
responsibility, answerability, and enforceability – for the sake of more rigorous application.23 
 Firstly, responsibility is counted as an essential component of accountability, in that those 
in positions of authority clearly define duties and performance standards, enabling their 
agencies to be reviewed transparently and objectively. Accountability makes it possible to 
delineate the respective responsibilities of different actors in the development processes. Clear 
identification of who is responsible for which commitments at the initial stage of aid 
programmes contributes to avoiding confusion on the issue of who is the partner who can hold 
the other partners to account for particular activities throughout the implementation and 
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evaluation process of aid programmes. Varieties of methods can be employed to clarify where 
responsibilities lie among programme partners involved: policy dialogues, MOU, due diligence 
programmes, safeguards, and so on.24 
 Secondly, the dimension of answerability requires that public officials and institutions 
provide reasoned justifications for their decisions to those they affect, particularly the public at 
large. In the context of development, the power balance between individuals and state 
institutions, or between providers of aid and the programme partners who use it, is often an 
asymmetrical.25 Enhancing transparencies for informational sharing transforms this asymmetry 
by recasting the relationship in terms of duty bearers and rights holders, empowering 
individuals (partner countries) to control the behaviour of public institutions (the other partners) 
as a matter of entitlement, and promoting the quality of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and 
peer review via symmetrically shared information and data openness. Accordingly, the concept 
of accountability is necessarily put on a more comprehensive terrain than transparency, because 
answerability is rather equivalent with transparency in practical terms.  
 Thirdly, enforceability requires public institutions to operate mechanisms that monitor the 
degree to which public officials and institutions comply with established standards, impose 
sanctions on officials who do not comply, and ensure that appropriate corrective and remedial 
action is taken when required. Enforcing accountability is not only concerned with penalties, 
but is about ensuring fair and systematic mechanisms are in place to assess compliance by 
partner countries with agreed standards of responsibility. In this sense, the introduction of 
enforcement mechanisms is regarded as the last resort for one partner to call on other partner 
countries to be accountable through either inspection mechanisms, for instance the Inspection 
Panel of the World Bank, or the rigorous oversight of progress, such as the Compliance Review 
mechanism of the Asian Development Bank.26 
 All in all, the MA prototype requires all three elements to be organically interconnected 
with each other: agreed standards to assign the responsibilities; transparent transfers of 
information; and established corrective actions against misbehaviours of public agencies. The 
Principal-Agent theory rephrases this by stating that principals must be able to evaluate the 
actions of the agencies and to sanction them if their performance is poor, for instance by 
removing them from their positions of authority.27 Thus, effective accountability requires 
mechanisms for steady and reliable information and communication between stakeholders as 
well as mechanisms for imposing penalties when required.28 
 However, either international aid agencies or traditional donors, which meet these three 
conditions of MA, are very rare. Indeed, it is not an easy task to satisfy all of them 
simultaneously by trying to be more open and attentive to serious complaints arising during 
programme implementation, adapting changing needs throughout the programme cycle, and 
complying with inspection results of punishments. Particularly, the enforceability factor is the 
most taxing component to the specific case of North-South cooperation, mainly because 
traditional donors are reluctant to adopt enforcement mechanisms that may hold back their 
strategic manoeuvres. What is worse, SSC partners have a strong tendency to perceive all three 
components as a kind of threat or structured shackles by which traditional donors rule the 
behaviour of partner countries.29 Therefore, the three components of MA need to be winnowed 
out by characterizing the horizontality of South-South development cooperation.  
 
Modalities of Accountability Mechanisms in South-South Cooperation 
Another way of translating MA for SSC is to conceive possible cases which can occur in the 
different combinations of related factors to both SSC and MA. As Richard Mulgan aptly asserts, 
accountability for collective action gives rise to a recurring problem of whether accountability 
should be concentrated or diffused.30 According to the number of actors involved and the 
profile of development cooperation programmes, the practical modalities of MA and the degree 
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of buck-passing (or accountability sharing) will be envisaged in varying ways. As Figure 1 
illustrates, the dimension that is used for a conceptual typology of the MA-SSC nexus is 
two-fold: 1) the number of actors (binary vs. plural); and 2) modalities of SSC (technical 
cooperation vs. infrastructure projects). Then, the two-by-two matrix demonstrates four 
possible scenarios of SSC by crosschecking the number of actors and modalities of SSC. 
 The main form of development cooperation in SSC, regardless of the number of actors, 
consists of technical cooperation aimed at promoting mutual trust, self-sustained cooperation, 
and solidarity, rather than being infrastructure-centred.31 The main reason for this observation 
results from the inherent nature of technical cooperation whose programmes cover a wide range 
of low cost schemes, such as technology transfers, knowledge sharing and exchange, 
co-research projects, training programmes, workshops and conferences, and human networking. 
Technical cooperation takes advantages of operational flexibilities and low cost in terms of 
time management, the number of participants, and the density of legal constraints. Therefore, 
enhancing the capacity of partner countries is taken into account as a critical instrument for 
consolidating MA among SSC countries. SSC actors, on the other hand, are prone to shirk 
financial responsibilities for high-cost investments when it comes to infrastructure projects 
requiring the rigid debt relationship with programme partners.  
 Likewise, the actor-based approach to modalities of SSC provides another interesting 
point: without the institutional setting for MA, the presence of two actors only, no matter 
whether they opt for technical cooperation or infrastructure, would create lower possibilities of 
buck-passing, whereas multiple stakeholders tend to pass the buck to other partners due to 
endogenous difficulties in clarifying where responsibilities lie evidently among the multiple 
number of actors.32 This phenomenon is quite a natural process, from the perspective of the 
rational-choice institutionalism, because the plural number of actors, under the absence of 
accountability mechanisms, fails to overcome the perverse incentives of actors that prevent 














 In the first category of the actor-modality matrix in which only two actors intend to carry 
out a set of technical cooperation, the relational pattern of actors’ behaviour would boil down to 
the form of ‘trust building.’ The purpose of technical cooperation, when the two SSC actors 
Trust Building Ad hoc Buck-Passing 
Strategic Alliance Routinized Buck-Passing 
Binary Plural  
Technical  
Cooperation 
Infrastructure-   
centred  
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pursue it in ad hoc meetings for training courses for instance, does not require high cost inputs 
of financial resources but intends to enrich mutual benefits by exchanging official staff and 
CSOs. The type of trust building, thus, does not have to call upon the two actors to be strictly 
accountable for their performance, mainly because bucks each actor needs to take responsible 
for are not heavy or even unclear. This pattern seems to be taken normally by the initial stage 
of consolidating mutual trust between two SSC actors. For example, the case of 
‘Bangladeshi-Korea BRAD Community Development’ represents a classic scenario of trust 
building of the binary technical cooperation mechanism. In this case, both parties shared tacit 
accountability under the clear division of mandates: while the government of Bangladesh was 
responsible for deputing senior officials to the site, the Korean government was responsible for 
dispatching experts from Korea to the site. Both parties are expected to increase mutual 
benefits and synergy effects in the development process at the local level, by exchanging 
human resources.34 Such a binary technical cooperation-based project, due to its nature of low 
cost inputs and mutual trust, does not require a meticulous set of MA.  
 In the second category where multiple partners operate technical cooperation, all actors 
involved tend to find a way of passing the buck to each other, on an ad hoc basis, rather than in 
a routinized fashion.35 For instance, in the case of ‘China-International Poverty Reduction 
Centre in China (IPRCC) as a Platform for SSC’, not only relevant ministries of China, but also 
several international institutions and bilateral donor agencies are engaged in IPRCC’s main task 
of organizing exchange of poverty reduction knowledge and experience and providing training 
and consultancy services. Likewise, the case of ‘Thailand-Cambodia-Laos-Myanmar-Vietnam 
Human Resources Development’ confirms the second category of the MA-SSC nexus, in the 
sense that the Thailand International Cooperation Agency undertook technical 
cooperation-based projects for bridging development gaps between Thailand and Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, based on each country’s comparative advantages with the 
recognition of the needs of partnership building to grow and prosper together through a 
multi-sectoral approach. These two cases demonstrate that accountability deficits are less 
seriously taken than those in infrastructure-based projects, even though multiple-stakeholders 
are ready to pass their bucks to other actors if the projects turn out to be failures. With a low 
level of mutual accountability in the mechanism, any centralized authorities, which can regulate 
all partners, have not been established yet. Without the mechanisms of MA, the innate attribute 
of multiplicity would prompt all actors to have perverse incentives of eschewing their own 
bucks, due to the absence of centralized authorities to regulate wilful behaviours of actors. 
Nevertheless, the density of buck-passing in technical cooperation will be no greater than in the 
case of infrastructure/investment, in that technical cooperation per se does not require a large 
scale of development financing, takes the off-the-cuff operational patterns in many cases, and 
hardly creates a high value of bucks. The introduction of MA to this categorization would be 
the best solution to not only institutionalize and consolidate the long-term sustainability of SSC, 
but also minimize the probability of collective action problems.  
 The third category composed of two actors and infrastructure-based cooperation would 
result in the relational feature of ‘strategic alliance’ under the lack of accountability 
mechanisms. Given the fact that there are only two players and that the SSC provider decides to 
assist a high-cost investment project at the expense of its national assets, it is highly plausible 
to assume that the SSC provider possesses strategic concerns and geopolitical proximity to 
support the targeted partner with the aim of holding the partner to be in favour of its strategic 
position. Instead, the provider needs to embark upon accountability mechanisms, at least to ask 
the partner country to submit periodic reports, to systematize information sharing, and to fulfil 
the conditions of coordination meetings and M&E. We collect three cases from the data pool, 
all of which confirm Egypt’s strategic moves on to its neighbouring fragile countries such as 
South Sudan and Uganda. 
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 The fourth pattern is found clearly in situations such as multiple-actors’ engagement in 
infrastructure or turnkey projects, in which the plural number of SSC actors are able to play 
dual roles as providers or recipients by investing in a commonly targeted sector at either the 
regional or specific country level. No accountability mechanisms would end in the worst 
scenario of governance within which each actor’s perverse incentive tends to override the 
urgency of common targets, thereby multiplying buck-passing, which cannot easily be tracked 
down. Indeed, it is not a plain process to delineate sharply not only who should be accountable 
but also to what degree the multiple stakeholders should be accountable for what.36 In 
consequence, this mode is most negatively conceived of being achievable in practice, which is 
confirmed by just one case that we found from the case collection of the TT-SSC (see Table1).  
 In a nutshell, there are two observations affecting commonly all four categorizations. 
Firstly, the multiple-actor-based modality of SSC shows more inclination to not only pass the 
buck to others when partners face the request for responsibility for the result of aid projects 
than bilateral-development modality. Secondly, the infrastructure/investment-based approach 
requiring high-cost inputs is equipped with much tighter mechanisms for accountability than 
technical cooperation-based cooperation. It is thus fair to argue that the combination of multiple 
actors and technical cooperation would be the most popular pattern that SSC actors prefer to 
take due to diluted requests for accountability as well as the tacit tolerance of buck-passing. 
Nevertheless, this multi- technical cooperation modality will be forced to call all participants to 
account if it seeks to sustain its long-term development. Sustainable and accountable 
development presupposes the greater participation of aid recipients and other related partners. 
Such a shift implies a concomitant decline in aid supplier’s authority over its own aid packages, 
but a greater responsibility on the side of the recipient. Therefore, the call for accountability 
mechanisms being rooted into the soil of SSC is a dead-end that the global South cannot avoid 
if it wants to make SSC more sustainable.   
 




• Bangladeshi-Korea BRAD Community Development 
• China-India Exchanging Development Experiences 
• Laos-Vietnam Exchanging on Local Administration 
Reform 
• Vietnam-Nepal Exchanging on Development Strategies  
Ad Hoc Buck-passing 
(Multi-Technical 
Cooperation) 
• Barefoot College – Boosting Rural Solar Energy 
• China-IPRCC as a Platform for SSC 
• ITEC India-Indian Expertise for Sustainable Development 
• Cuba-Africa Promoting Integrated Health Services 
• IBSA-Guinea Bissau Boosting Food Self-Sufficiency  
• India-Pan-African E-Network for Medical Services and 
Human Services 
• NEPAD Promoting E-Schools in Africa 
• Thailand-Cambodia-Laos-Myanmar-Vietnam ACMECS 
Human Resources Development 
Strategic Alliance 
(Bi-Infra) 
• Egypt-South Sudan Generating Electricity in South Sudan  
• Egypt-South Sudan Establishing Two Family Medical 
Units in South Sudan  




• NEPAD Investing in Agriculture and Food Security in 
Africa 
Sources: www.southsouthcases.info.  
 
 
Forging Accountability Mechanisms in South-South Cooperation 
 
The next task for forging MA for SSC is to discuss which component of MA is the first-order 
condition for the successful management of operating SSC under the assumption that all three 
components are not satisfied and how MA can be realistically tailored to the distinctive assets 
of SSC and local contexts of South-South partners. Not taking for granted the existing Western 
conceptualization of MA, SSC needs to develop its own path of accountability mechanisms to 
prevent the other partners from abusing power and resources and enhance trust building and 
knowledge sharing for mutual benefit. It is thus important to note that mainstreaming MA into 
SSC implies the systematic search of its distinctive trajectory by means of the reflexive review 




























 Most of all, it is necessary to review how the three components of MA can be customized 
to the context of SSC. On the spectrum of time spans indicating the degree of maturity in 
implementing development cooperation programmes (see Figure 2), each element of MA – 
responsibility, answerability and enforcement – is respectively positioned at different points of 
time. Responsibility is undertaken as the major value and mechanism for loosened patterns of 
development cooperation at the initial stage. Answerability denotes more matured 
Responsibility Answerability  Enforceability  
Early initial stages Final stages/last resorts 
• MOU 
• Policy dialogue 
• Trust building 
• Safeguards 
• Due diligence 
programme 
• Database sharing 
• M&E 
• Transparency 
• Data Revolution 
• Peer review  






accountability systems than responsibility in the sense that all actors at this stage mutually hold 
each other to be accountable through mutual assessment, M&E, transparent information sharing 
and peer review. Enforcement is referred as to the last resort of MA in which actors are able to 
bring legal claims to the inspection panel or compliance review panels for the purpose of ex 
post resettlement processes. However, all three components are not always mutually exclusive. 
 It is recognizable that the current level of institutional maturity in cases of SSC retards its 
MA mechanism from functioning in tandem with answerability and enforceability. Starting 
from responsibility clarifying duty-bearer vis-à-vis rights-holder, SSC is able to identify its 
precise space, time and conditions under which MA can be institutionally consolidated even in 
a partial form. Ultimately, to mainstream MA for SSC involves the task of how to soften 
accountability mechanisms, rather than that of how to accommodate itself to the international 
standards of MA as a whole. Considering that the political elites of developing countries may 
lack understanding of accountability and have lower credibility of institutionalizing 
accountability mechanisms, we are not able to drive them into copying the Western model of 
MA without adjustments for their own cultural and historical variations.37 
 Hence, accountability mechanisms need to be institutionally set up and locally 
consolidated on the demand-driven basis of SSC partner countries. ‘Going local’ matters with 
regards to better governance of accountability in order to manage a variety of tasks amidst 
conflicting pressures and new expectations for the local contexts of SSC partners.38 
Developing countries, particularly in crisis and transition situations, will face strong challenges 
at the national-level MA, much more severe than traditional donors in financial crises. Strong 
national-level mutual accountability mechanisms have a major quantifiable impact on changing 
SSC countries’ behaviour in the way they manage and deliver development cooperation. 
Therefore, the strong encouragement that all SSC countries proactively participate in the 
formation of national-level MA mechanisms first is a silver-bullet for mainstreaming MA in the 
unlikely context of SSC.  
 In so doing, SSC actors keep on holding the dimension of responsibility as the essential 
foundation; if excessively speedy commitments are carried out in this process, for instance 
adopting enforcement mechanisms, they fail to sustain institutional reforms for translating MA 
into their own contexts. In this sense, aid effectiveness depends upon aid programmes that 
strengthen, not undermine, domestic accountability, even though domestic accountability 
mechanisms are affected and complicated by multiple global factors, mainly external aid 
donors. A minimal approach to MA, embedded in the domestic milieu of SSC partners, is 
worth considering as an institutional safeguard to prevent perverse incentives from being 
pursued even at an initial stage of accountability mechanisms in unlikely settings of SSC. On 
top of national MA, international-level accountability can be further coordinated and developed 
by reflecting and orchestrating locally-driven frameworks to monitor the quality and results of 
development cooperation, including specific annual performance targets for individual partner 
countries, aligned to national development priorities.39 
  
Concluding Remarks: In Search of Soft Accountability  
The accountability mechanism is at the centre of democratic governance. According to Francis 
Fukuyama, the concrete development of political accountability is the de facto sweeping 
account of why some countries in the world failed to survive and some countries continued to 
prevail.40 Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, in a similar vein, argue that economic 
success will be sustained when the government becomes accountable and responsive to citizens 
and the great mass of people in the country.41 In the domain of global governance, their 
scholarly accounts are not easily applied, owing to the absence of centralized enforcement 
authorities that regulate and coordinate varieties of national contexts in a single frame. 
Moreover, SSC represents a separate zone from the traditional architecture of aid effectiveness 
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and global governance. Accordingly, the making of MA for SSC requires new alternative 
approaches to repair rifts between the global North and the global South. This is the very 
reason why we need seek the ‘soft accountability’ apart from the traditional Western models. 
 MA for SSC is required to launch a domestic accountability mechanism in order to make 
it more transparent and sustainable. It should be a deliberate outgrowth of reflecting distinctive 
conditions of developing countries involved in SSC, rather than importing MA’s Western 
models without modifications. In the longer term, it also needs to be aligned and harmonized 
with international or regional standardizations of MA. However, there is always a serious 
loophole in connecting national MA with international MA: who is going to take the lead of 
this linkage? Strong global accountability frameworks call for the need for political leadership 
or centralized authorities in implementing coordinated outcomes from accountability dialogues 
to promote behavioural changes at the global level and the decentralizing process to fit national 
priorities as well. 
 Such an institutional effort to set in motion MA at the domestic level of SSC countries 
should concentrate on the initial domain of responsibility first, rather than the full package of 
accountability. The rash demand for answerability and enforceability easily comes to bring 
about the politicization of MA among SSC countries, mainly because they are sensitive enough 
to external interventions into national affairs and sovereign issues. The slack profile of 
technical cooperation-centred projects among SSC partners also dilutes the sense of strong 
monitoring systems and accountability review mechanisms. The request for enforcement is too 
early to be taken into consideration by partner countries, as they have no genuine interest in 
how to hold each other to account mutually through tight legal policies. 
 Any credible MA frame for SSC, therefore, is expected to revisit the existing universal 
standardization of accountability mechanisms, which culminates in how to make an alternative 
definition of ‘soft’ accountability. Soft accountability shares Gunnar Myrdal’s assumptions on 
‘soft state’, with specific reference to a general societal indiscipline which manifest itself by 
deficiencies in accountability mechanisms, particularly enforcement, a widespread perverse 
incentive by SSC partners, and its collusion with the Western view of accountability.42 Having 
said that, soft accountability is referred to as a flexible re-conceptualization of accountability, 
designed to enhance its adaptability to SSC partners, on the basis of their own distinctions of 
contextual environments, as well as varying degrees of capabilities in introducing 
accountability mechanisms to coordinate and regulate the behaviours of SSC partners. Among 
the three components of MA discussed above, responsibility would be a stepping stone of soft 
accountability in the context of SSC, but soft accountability is supposed to contain the next 
stages of MA, such as answerability and enforceability in accordance with due course of time 
and due process of institutional maturity. 
 Some descriptions of MA for SSC are further undertaken to consolidate the concept of 
soft accountability. The following four essences for these conditions are summarized and 
suggested on the basis of what we have discussed hitherto: 1) soft accountability should be 
voluntary based and self-disciplinary; 2) soft accountability should be based upon 
demand-driven accountability mechanisms; 3) an international MA platform is required to 
coordinate and customize the different contexts of SSC partners; and 4) soft accountability 
should adopt the discourses of global partnership with the rectification and modification by 
which SSC partners are able to translate them into their own standards.  
 In search of soft accountability, it is important to remember that the overemphasis of 
accountability is always counterproductive in terms of its negative impacts on the efficiency of 
aid projects.43 Introducing MA with no serious consideration of local conditions in partner 
countries fails to achieve its original goals of holding all participants to account; rather, it is 
more likely to undermine efficiency in exchange for enhancing accountability in an abused 
fashion. Accordingly, an incremental institutionalization of MA through the softening process 
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of how accountability mechanisms are realistically adapted to local culture and values would be 
the effective way of reducing the probability of abusing MA and reconciling the trade-off 
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